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LatinoJustice PRLDEF, The DREAM Bar Association, and individuals
Sergio C. Garcia, Cesar Adrian Vargas, Jose Manuel Godinez-Samperio, Karla
Q. Perez Ramirez, Denia C. Perez, Marisol Conde-Hernández, Kelsey C. Burke,
and Jackeline Saavedra-Arizaga (collectively “the LatinoJustice Amici”),
hereby respectfully submit this amicus curiae brief in support of Petitioners
Mary Doe and Jane Doe, who seek a rule change that would “allow Bar
admission for undocumented immigrants who otherwise meet Utah standards
for admission.” Petition (“Pet.”) 1. This Court’s November 19, 2018 order
invited briefing on whether this Court may “‘enact[] … a [S]tate law’ under 8
U.S.C. § 1621(d) permitting membership in the Utah

State Bar for

undocumented immigrants; and, if so, whether it would be appropriate for this
Court to do so.” On January 17, 2019, this Court granted the LatinoJustice
Amici leave to file this brief.
INTRODUCTION AND AMICI’S INTEREST IN THIS MATTER
Petitioners1 were brought to the United States as children and know only
the United States as their home. Pet. 2. And they are not alone—hundreds of

Petitioners filed the petition under the pseudonyms “Mary Doe” and
“Jane Doe” to preserve their privacy. Pet. 1. Consequently, this brief uses the
generic term “Petitioners” to describe the two individuals seeking admission to
the Utah Bar under the proposed rule change, despite Rule 24(d). See Utah R.
App. P. 24(d) (stating this Court’s preference that parties in a case “not be
described solely by the party’s procedural role”).
1

1

thousands of people share this story. 2 Some, like Petitioners, aspire to be
lawyers. Through hard work and dedication, they graduate high school, college,
and law school, often excelling far beyond their peers. Federal law, however,
purportedly prohibits states from providing any benefits including professional
licenses to these praiseworthy individuals unless “a State” expressly opts out
of the prohibition. 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). The Petition asks this Court, as the
constitutionally authorized arm of the State, to “opt out” by adopting proposed
Rule 14-721, which would expressly allow Petitioners and those law graduates
similarly situated to “be admitted to the Bar.” Pet. Ex. A.
The Petition presents two major issues: whether this Court is the
appropriate branch of government to opt out, and whether opting out is the
appropriate thing to do. For the reasons set forth below, this Court has the
authority to opt out under § 1621(d), and it should grant the Petition and adopt
a rule authorizing unauthorized immigrants3 to “be admitted to the Bar.” Pet.
Ex. A. The LatinoJustice Amici agree with amicus curiae Ad Hoc Coalition of
Utah Law Professors that this Court should adopt a rule that allows “the

As of July 31, 2018, there were just over 700,000 active DACA recipients.
UCSIS, Approximate Active DACA Recipients: Country of Birth, at 1 (Aug. 31,
2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%
20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/D
ACA/DACA_Population_Data_July_31_2018.pdf.
3
This brief uses the term “unauthorized immigrants” to be consistent with
this Petition’s chosen term. Pet. Ex. A.
2

2

admission of otherwise eligible unauthorized immigrants to the practice of law
in Utah,” regardless of their precise immigration status. Br. of Ad Hoc
Coalition of Law Professors 25–28. In this Brief, the LatinoJustice Amici refer
to this broader rule as the “Proposed Rule.”
The LatinoJustice Amici are especially interested in the outcome of this
proceeding. Founded in 1972 as the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Education
Fund, LatinoJustice PRLDEF works to create and protect opportunities for the
greater pan-Latinx4 population, particularly for its most vulnerable members,
including recent immigrants. For forty-seven years, a core and unique focus for
LatinoJustice has been its efforts to diversify and improve the legal system by
increasing law school admissions opportunities for students of color and
enhancing diversity within the legal profession. To that end, LatinoJustice has
counseled, mentored, supported, and advocated for or litigated on behalf of
many DREAMers5 and DACAmented6 law students working toward becoming

“Latinx” is the “gender-neutral alternative to Latino or Latina.” Latinx,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/Latinx (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
5
“DREAMers” refers to those who would likely benefit from the
Development, Relief, and Education of Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act, should it
become federal law.
6
“DACAmented” is a play on the term “documented” as used in the
immigration context, and the term is commonly used to refer to the work
authorization documents provided to beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy.
4

3

lawyers. Among them are DREAMer law graduates who have been admitted
to practice in New York, Florida, California, New Jersey, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, and Texas among other states, including those individuals
discussed in the Petition. See Pet. 7–12.
Of particular relevance in the instant proceeding, LatinoJustice
represented Cesar Vargas, a DREAMer and a 2011 City University of New
York law graduate, in his successful New York bar admission effort. His case,
In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 582 (App. Div. 2015), is one of the leading cases
in the country addressing the eligibility of DACAmented law graduates for
state bar admission. As discussed below, the New York court determined that
a DACAmented law graduate like Vargas could fulfill the requisite character
and fitness and requirements for bar admission and be granted a professional
law license. Id. at 587–89, 597. LatinoJustice has been involved with several
other bar admission cases throughout the country, either representing
individuals seeking admission or filing amicus briefs on their behalf.
LatinoJustice thus has a long, well-established interest in the issue facing
Petitioners, as well as significant experience in the issues facing this Court.
The DREAM Bar Association has a keen interest in this case as well, and
for largely the same reasons. The DREAM Bar Association is an
unincorporated organization that welcomes undocumented and allied legal
professionals, law students, and aspiring law students. The Association
4

collects no dues or other monies. Its members include individuals similarly
situated to Petitioners—otherwise qualified individuals who hope to graduate
law school and be admitted to the bars of their respective states. The DREAM
Bar Association has a deep interest in ensuring its members and the broader
community receive the chance to become successful members of the bar in all
states.
Finally, several individuals join LatinoJustice and the DREAM Bar
Association as amici in this brief. They include DREAMer and other immigrant
law graduates from other states, including Cesar Vargas, Sergio Garcia, and
Jose Manuel Godinez-Samperio, whose “test” bar admission cases in New York,
California, and Florida have previously addressed the very issues presented
herein. They also include immigrant law graduates who became members of
the bars in Texas, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut. These
individuals have a unique, real-world perspective on the legal and practical
issues surrounding the bar admission of immigrant law graduates, as
discussed more fully below.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Federal law prohibits states from providing certain “professional
license[s]” to immigrants who are “not lawfully present in the United States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1621. But states may opt out of this prohibition “through the
enactment of a State law.” Id. § 1621(d). Petitioners ask the Court to adopt
5

Rule 14-721 as part of this Court’s Rules of Professional Practice. It would
allow “[u]nauthorized immigrants” to be admitted to the Bar if they (1)
otherwise qualify, (2) were brought to the United States as children and have
lived here ever since, and (3) received “documented employment authorization
from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.” Pet. Ex. A. The
issues presented by the instant petition are whether this Court

is the

appropriate authority to “enact[] … a State law” under § 1621(d), and whether
this Court should enact such a law.7 See Order dated 11/20/2018, Case No.
20180806-SC.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

The Department of Homeland Security Established Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals in 2012.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) established

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), under which DHS may
exercise its discretion in refraining from deporting or removing from the
country certain unauthorized immigrants.8 DACA is one of several forms of

But, as explained by amicus Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah Law Professors,
there is a compelling argument that a Utah bar license does not fall within
§ 1621’s prohibition. Br. of Ad Hoc Coalition of Law Professors 7–15. Thus, this
Court need not “opt out” under § 1621(d) if § 1621 does not apply to Utah bar
licenses.
8
See DHS, Memorandum from Janet Napolitano (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
7

6

“deferred action” that federal executive authorities have offered to individual
immigrants, or groups of immigrants, for humanitarian or other reasons.9
DHS considers recipients of deferred action lawfully present in the U.S.
for certain purposes.10 For example, if DACA recipients eventually leave the
country and seek re-admission to the United States, their time as DACA
recipients will not count as time in “unlawful presence,” which otherwise might
have counted against their future admissibility.11 Similarly, the federal Real
ID Act, under which states may issue drivers’ licenses only to immigrants

For a review of federal use of deferred action before the DACA policy was
announced, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
in Immigration Law, 9 Conn. Pub. Intl. L. J. 243 (2010).
10
See USCIS, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Toolkit, at
10–11 (July 29, 2014), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Humanitarian/Deferred%20Action%20for%20Childhood%20Arrivals/DACA_T
oolkit_CP_072914.pdf; see also Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053,
1059 (9th Cir. 2014) (“DHS considers DACA recipients not to be unlawfully
present in the United States because their deferred action is a period of stay
authorized by the Attorney General.”).
11
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (providing that deferred action does not count
as “unlawful presence”); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (an alien is deemed
“unlawfully present” for purposes of ineligibility for future admission if the
alien is present beyond a “period of stay authorized by the Attorney General”
or without being admitted or paroled).
9

7

“authorized [to] stay in the United States,” expressly identifies deferred action
as a “period of authorized stay.”12
Although DACA does not confer “lawful status” on an individual (because
only Congress can create or define an immigration status13), DACA recipients,
like others who receive deferred action, are eligible for employment
authorization. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).
To be eligible for DACA relief, an applicant must be an alien without
lawful status who arrived in the United States before the age of sixteen and
who is now less than thirty-one years old. Applicants must also have no
significant criminal record, as well as a high-school education or service in the
U.S. armed forces.14
II.

DHS May Also Grant Temporary Protected Status to Certain
Unauthorized Immigrants.
Besides DACA, DHS may also designate certain foreign countries for

Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”). 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). For unauthorized
immigrants from such designated countries, the Attorney General “may grant

Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii), (C)(i)(ii), 119 Stat. 302, 313; see also Brewer, 757 F.3d at 1074 n.9 (Christen, J.,
concurring).
13
See DHS, Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 8.
14
See USCIS, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) (Feb. 14, 2018), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/considerationdeferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca.
12

8

the alien temporary protected status in the United States.” Id. § 1254a(a)(1)(A).
A person granted TPS is protected from removal and may obtain authorization
to work in the United States. Id. § 1254a(a)(1)–(2).
An unauthorized immigrant granted TPS is similar to a DACA
recipient—the person is able to live and work in the U.S., but TPS “does not
lead to lawful permanent resident status or give any other immigration status.”
Temporary

Protected

Status:

What

is

TPS,

https://www.uscis.gov/

humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). TPS,
however, is not limited to those who were brought to this country as minors.
See id. Amicus Kelsey Burke is an example of a person granted TPS who, as
discussed below, was ultimately admitted to practice in Florida.15
III.

The Personal Responsibility
Reconciliation Act of 1996.

and

Work

Opportunities

Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (“the 1996 Act”) in 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 U.S. Stat.
2105. The 1996 Act prohibits states from conferring certain public benefits,
including professional licenses, upon defined “aliens” unless they are exempted.
8 U.S.C. § 1621(a), (c)(1)(A). The stated goals of this prohibition are to promote
self-sufficiency of residing noncitizens, and to prevent “the availability of

The availability of TPS supports the argument that this Court should
adopt a broader rule than the one Petitioners propose. Br. of Ad Hoc Coalition
of Law Professors 25–28.

15

9

public benefits” from being “an incentive for immigration.” 8 U.S.C.§ 1601.
Immigrants are incentivized to rely on their own capabilities and not U.S.
public benefit systems. Id. Despite these goals, the statute inexplicably
includes certain professional licenses within the definition of a state public
benefit. 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history
indicates why professional licenses, which would promote self-sufficiency, are
categorized as a public benefit.
Regardless, the prohibition against professional licenses has an
important exception rooted in federalism. Under § 1621(d), a state may give
benefits to immigrants who are not lawfully present if it does so by “the
enactment of a State law.” The Petition refers to this exception as “the opt out”
provision. Pet. 3–4. The opt out provision shows that, although Congress was
concerned about public benefit access to unauthorized immigrants, Congress
also recognized that each state has the right to make its own decisions about
state-provided benefits.

10

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE PROPOSED RULE AND
ALLOW UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT LAW GRADUATES BAR
ADMISSION BECAUSE A BAR APPLICANT’S IMMIGRATION
STATUS DOES NOT PREVENT THAT APPLICANT FROM
ESTABLISHING
CHARACTER
AND
FITNESS
FOR
PRACTICING LAW.
Petitioners, and other qualified immigrant law graduates, possess the

qualities and traits necessary for the practice of law and can fulfill all the
requirements for admission to the Utah Bar, were it not for their immigration
status. This Court should adopt the Proposed Rule because this Court’s
character and fitness rules already ensure that only qualified applicants
practice law in Utah. The Proposed Rule would not alter that requirement or
enable an otherwise unqualified applicant from obtaining a bar license.
Immigrant law graduates are undoubtedly capable of establishing the
requisite character and fitness for practicing law in Utah. They possess the
same personal qualities as any other non-immigrant law graduate. A bar
applicant’s immigration status does not inherently reflect anything negative
about that applicant’s character or fitness for practicing law. Inasmuch as
there is no apparent valid reason for this Court to categorically preclude
immigrant law graduates from practicing law, this Court should adopt the
Proposed Rule.

11

A.

The Character and Fitness Committee’s Individualized
Review of Bar Applicants Ensures that Only Qualified
Applicants Obtain a Bar License.

This Court’s rules governing admission to the Utah Bar already ensure
that only well-qualified applicants of good moral character gain admission to
the bar. A categorical ban on unauthorized immigrants from the practice of law
would be inconsistent with the individualized review prescribed by this Court’s
current rules.
Among other things, law graduates applying to the bar must prove “by
clear and convincing evidence” that they graduated from an approved law
school, have good moral character, and have passed the MPRE and the bar
exam. Utah R. Bar Admission 14-703. Attorney applicants, like Petitioners,
must also prove their admission to another state’s bar and that they are in
good standing in all jurisdictions where they are admitted. Id. 14-704(a).
To prove sufficient moral character, all applicants must “pass a character
and

fitness

investigation.”

Admissions,

Utah

State

Bar,

http://www.utahbar.org/admissions/ (last visited March 26, 2019); see also
Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708. The Character and Fitness Committee’s
investigation is an individualized review of an applicant’s background to
determine if the applicant’s “record of conduct justifies the trust of clients,
adversaries, courts, and others with respect to the professional duties owed to
them.” Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708(a). As part of the process, the Character
12

and Fitness Committee can gain access to and review an applicant’s prior
employment records, school records, credit report, health care facility records,
and records regarding formal or informal complaints or charges against the
applicant. Id. 14-707(a) (requiring bar applicants to include in their
applications “an authorization and release enabling the Bar to obtain
information concerning the Applicant”); Authorization and Release Form, Utah
State Bar, http://www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Authorizationand-Release-1.doc (Utah Bar’s notarized form indicating the full extent of the
authorization an applicant provides the Character and Fitness Committee for
its investigation). The process is thorough. It may include an informal
investigative interview, a formal hearing, and a later review of a formal
hearing decision. Id. 14-708(b)–(c).
Petitioners, like most other unauthorized immigrant law graduates in
similar situations, are otherwise qualified for admission into the Utah Bar, and
they would likely be admitted if Utah opted out of § 1621’s broad, blanket
prohibition. Pet. 2–3, 6. They have graduated from approved law schools,
already passed rigorous bar and MPRE exams in other jurisdictions, and have
otherwise proved their high moral character and fitness to practice law. Utah’s
current application process ensures only high-qualified individuals obtain a
bar license, and categorically banning unauthorized immigrants from being
eligible for the bar adds nothing to that process and robs Utah of legal talent.
13

Thus, adopting the Proposed Rule would have no adverse impact on the quality
of attorneys admitted to the Utah Bar.
B.

Unauthorized Immigrants Are as Capable of Practicing
Law as Other Utah Attorneys.

A person’s immigration status is not relevant to the key traits the
Character and Fitness Committee considers in determining an applicant’s
character. In determining an applicant’s character, the Character and Fitness
Committee considers, among other things, evidence of an applicant’s honesty,
academic and work history, financial and professional responsibility,
emotional and mental stability, drug or alcohol dependence, civility, diligence,
reliability, and civil, criminal, or disciplinary charges. Utah R. Bar Admission
14-708(d), (f).
A person’s immigration status does not affect these issues—
unauthorized immigrants are equally able as other applicants to demonstrate
they possess these traits and are honest, responsible, and civil. Thus, a
complete ban of unauthorized immigrants will accomplish nothing more than
preventing highly qualified and morally fit applicants from serving as
upstanding Utah attorneys.
The experiences of the following LatinoJustice Amici prove the point.
Amicus Cesar Vargas came to the U.S. from Mexico at five years old,
after his father passed away. See In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 582 (App. Div.

14

2015). After graduating from a New York public high school, Mr. Vargas
attended St. Francis College in Brooklyn, id., as an honors student. He then
attended law school at the City University of New York, where he obtained
valuable internships with Main Street Legal Services, Inc., the Office of the
District Attorney of Kings County, and a New York State Supreme Court
Justice. Id. He also worked as a legislative intern for a member of the United
States Congress. Id. at 582–83. After graduation from law school, he took (and
passed) the New York bar, applied for DACA, and then applied for admission
to the New York Bar. Id. During all of this, Mr. Vargas also co-founded the
Dram Action Coalition advocacy group. A subcommittee of New York’s
Character Committee found that Mr. Vargas “appears to have stellar character”
and that, were it not for the legal issues surrounding his immigration status,
it “would have no hesitation recommending Mr. Vargas’ admission to the New
York Bar.” Id. at 584.
The Vargas court ultimately held that the judiciary had the authority to
opt out of the statute under § 1621(d), and determined that Mr. Vargas was
eligible for admission to the New York Bar. Id. at 589–97. Since then, Mr.
Vargas has had a successful legal career, including speaking at congressional
hearings, volunteering at legal clinics to help immigrants learn their rights,
and providing pro-bono representation to children facing deportation in
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immigration court. 16 Recently, NY1, a New York cable television station,
brought Mr. Vargas on board to answer questions from the public and discuss
immigration law and issues. 17 Mr. Vargas is also a frequent political
commentator on CNN, MSNBC, FOXNews, Univision, and Telemundo, and he
is a columnist on The Hill, Washington Post, New York Times, Politico, and
other top publications, where he writes on immigration issues. Mr. Vargas is
now a lawful permanent resident, and just over a month ago, he enlisted in the
U.S. Army and is currently in basic training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
Amicus Sergio Garcia grew up in both Mexico and the U.S. In re Garcia,
315 P.3d 117, 121 (Cal. 2014). His parents brought him to the U.S. when he
was an infant but moved with him back to Mexico when he was nine years old.
Id. His parents then brought him back to the U.S. when he was seventeen years
old, at which time Sergio’s father filed an immigration visa petition on Sergio’s
behalf. Id. But, due to the massive “backlog of persons of Mexican origin who
are seeking immigrant visas,” as of 2014, Sergio’s visa number still had not

See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, An Undocumented Teen Gains Asylum With The
Help Of His Undocumented Lawyer, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2017, 8:00
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/cesar-vargas-undocumentedlawyer-client_us_59727244e4b09e5f6ccf6cf6.
17
An example of one such segment can be found at
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/news/2018/04/27/immigrant-advocatediscusses-nypd-partnership-ice-raids-.
16
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come up—“more than 19 years” after his father submitted his visa petition.18
Id. at 121–22. Sergio graduated high school in California and received offers to
attend Stanford, University of California at Berkley, and University of
California at Davis, but he was unable to accept those institutions’
scholarships due to his immigration status. Instead, he attended Butte College,
California State University at Chico, and Cal Northern School of Law, where
he received his law degree in May 2009. Id. at 122. In July 2009, he passed the
California bar examination on his first try.19 See id. The California Committee
on Bar Examiners found Sergio otherwise qualified for admission to the
California bar, and after the California legislature opted out of § 1621(d), he
was admitted to the California bar. Id. at 120. He now works as a California
attorney. Paul Elias, Associated Press, Immigrant California lawyer finally
gets

green

card,

LAS

VEGAS

SUN,

(June

4,

2015,

6:00

PM),

Sergio eventually received his green card after being admitted to the
California bar as an unauthorized immigrant. Paul Elias, Associated Press,
Immigrant California lawyer finally gets green card, LAS VEGAS SUN, (June 4,
2015, 6:00 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/jun/04/immigrantcalifornia-lawyer-finally-gets-green-car/.
19
Passing the California bar is no easy feat—only 56.4 percent of Sergio’s
peers passed the July 2009 exam. Staci Zaretsky, California’s Bar Exam
Passage Rate Reaches 32-Year Low, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 21, 2016, 12:15 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2016/11/californias-bar-exam-passage-rate-reaches32-year-low/.
18

17

https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/jun/04/immigrant-california-lawyerfinally-gets-green-car/.
Amicus Jose Manuel Godinez-Samperio came with his parents to the U.S.
from Mexico in 1995, when he was nine years old. He arrived on a B-2
Nonimmigrant Visa 20 , but then lost his visa status, thereby becoming an
unauthorized immigrant. Still, he graduated as the valedictorian of his high
school class and obtained a private scholarship to attend New College of
Florida. After he graduated, he attended Florida State University College of
Law, also on a private scholarship. He passed the bar in 2011 but was not
initially admitted to the Florida Bar. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Question
as to Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admission to the
Florida Bar, 134 So.3d 432, 433 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). Instead, the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners sought an advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme
Court about admitting unauthorized immigrants. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court determined (incorrectly) that § 1621(d)’s opt
out provision required the Florida Legislature to act. Id. at 435. Notably, the
parties did not raise the Tenth Amendment issues posed by the court’s
interpretation of § 1621(d), and thus the court did not address that issue,

The B-2 visa is referred to as a “Tourism” visa. U.S. Department of State,
Visitor Visa Overview, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/
tourism-visit/visitor.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
20
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discussed more fully below. A few months later, Florida’s legislature adopted
legislation to opt out of § 1621, which paved the way for Mr. GodinezSamperio’s admission to the Florida bar. See The Florida Bar, GodinezSamperio Finally Becomes A Florida Lawyer, FLORIDA BAR NEWS (Dec. 15,
2014),

https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/godinez-samperio-

finally-becomes-a-florida-lawyer/.
Amicus Kelsey Burke was initially denied permission to take the bar
exam by the Florida bar examiners based on the Florida Supreme Court’s
incorrect interpretation of § 1621(d). Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners, 134 So.3d
at 437. She came to the U.S. from Honduras when she was ten years old,
making the trek by foot, and after graduation from high school, she obtained
Temporary Protected Status 21 and work authorization. Frank Cerabino,
Legislators should act to help worthy Boynton immigrant be admitted to
Florida Bar, THE PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 12, 2014, 12:01 AM),
https://pbpo.st/2JmaLwC. She worked her way through college at Florida
Atlantic University, finishing her bachelor’s degree in three years and
graduating debt free. See id. She then graduated from law school at Florida

As noted above, TPS is similar to DACA in that it grants deferred status
on a person, protects that person from removal, and allows that person work
authorization. USCIS, Temporary Protected Status: What is TPS,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited
Mar. 26, 2019).
21

19

Agriculture and Mechanical University, for which she paid through a private
loan with help of a generous family that took her in. Id. After the Florida
Legislature opted out of § 1621’s prohibition, Ms. Burke was eventually
permitted to take the Florida bar exam and be admitted to the Florida bar. She
is one of a handful of female personal injury attorneys in Palm Beach County,
and she mentors students from middle school to law school, as well as young
attorneys in the community through volunteering and pro-bono work.22
Amicus Denia Perez was born in Mexico and came to the U.S. with her
parents when she was eleven months old. San Francisco State University,
Alum Denia Perez Becomes First DACA Recipient Admitted to Connecticut Bar
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://bit.ly/2YfbX8t. She is the first in her family to graduate
from college and based on her experience (and her parents’ experience) with
the U.S. immigration system, Ms. Perez decided to attend Quinnipiac
University School of Law. Soon after graduating law school, Ms. Perez spoke
at a public hearing of the Connecticut Rules Committee, which was considering
a change to Connecticut’s bar admission rules to allow those like Ms. Perez
admission to the Connecticut bar. Robert Storace, This Undocumented
Immigrant Just Graduated Law School. Now She Wants To Change Who Can

Senator Durbin of Illinois shared Ms. Burke’s story on the floor of the
U.S. Senate in 2012, a video of which is available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=CNkhv7rZRpE.
22

20

Practice Law, CONNECTICUTLAWTRIBUNE (May 14, 2018, 3:27 PM),
https://bit.ly/2FoVgi5. Connecticut adopted its new rule in June 2018, which
allows admission to the bar so long as the applicant is “authorized to work
lawfully in the United States.” Robert Storace, This Young Attorney Is the First
DACA

Recipient

Admitted

to

Practice

Law

in

Connecticut,

CONNECTICUTLAWTRIBUNE (Nov. 2, 2018, 6:50 PM), https://bit.ly/2YfcpUd. As
of November 2, 2018, she was the first unauthorized immigrant granted
admission to the Connecticut bar. Id. She is currently an Immigrant Justice
Fellow at Make the Road New York, representing clients in immigration
proceedings.
Amicus Karla Perez was born in Mexico and came to the U.S. with her
parents when she was two years old. Elise Foley, Court To Weight Fate Of
Dreamers, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:45 AM), https://bit.ly/2OpLpgi.
She graduated from the Bauer College of Business and the Honors College at
the University of Houston, and she went on to get her law degree from the
University of Houston Law Center. While a law student, she interned with the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Tahirih Justice
Center, and Baker Ripley’s Immigration and Citizenship Program. See Karla
Perez, Opinion: DACA let me serve Houston. Now Congress should make it
permanent, HOUSTON CHRONICAL (Feb. 14, 2019), https://bit.ly/2tnpoES. She
passed the July 2018 Texas bar exam, was admitted to the Texas Bar in
21

November 2018, and works as an immigration attorney, “helping survivors of
gender-based violence in underserved communities throughout Houston.” Id.
Ms. Perez is currently an Equal Justice Works Fellow sponsored by in part by
Greenberg Traurig, LLP and The Texas Access to Justice Foundation and
hosted by the Tahirih Justice Center in Houston, Texas. She also serves on the
national board of United We Dream, which is the nation’s largest immigrant
youth-led organization. Ms. Perez has since become a lawful permanent
resident.
Amicus Marisol Conde-Hernández was born in Mexico and, when she
was one year old, her parents brought her to the U.S. Before going to law school,
Ms. Conde-Hernández founded New Jersey’s first undocumented, youth-led
immigrant rights group. Elise Schoening, Undocumented immigrant becomes
activist, THE SIGNAL (Mar. 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/2panvJ6. She graduated
from Rutgers University New Brunswick summa cum laude before attending
Rutgers Law School, where she was the Marsha Wenks Public Interest Fellow
and Co-Chair of Rutger’s Immigrant Rights Collective. Upon graduation, she
became the first undocumented law graduate from a New Jersey law school.
See id. She was admitted to the New Jersey bar in October 2018, becoming
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New Jersey’s first undocumented female attorney. She currently practices
immigration law and criminal defense in New Jersey.23
Amicus Jackeline Saavedra-Arizaga came from Peru to the U.S. when
she was fourteen years old. After graduating high school, Ms. SaavedraArizaga worked different jobs to pay for college, eventually graduating cum
laude from the State University of New York at Stony Brook in 2007. See Chau
Lam, Mixed reaction to Obama immigration policy, NEWSDAY (June 15, 2012,
10:37 PM), https://www.newsday.com/long-island/mixed-reaction-to-obamaimmigration-policy-1.3785384. Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga then attended law
school at Touro College. In law school, Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga was a legal fellow
at SEPA Mujer, where she advocated for domestic violence survivors and
others within the Latina community on Long Island. LONG ISLAND REGIONAL
IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE CENTER, About, http://www.longislandriac.com/abo
ut.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). She was also recognized in 2012 as one of
the “40 under 40 Latino Rising Stars” by the Hispanic Coalition, New York. Id.
In 2013, Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga received DACA status and graduated law
school. Following the Vargas decision, Ms. Saavedra-Arizaga was admitted to
the New York bar in 2015. She is now an attorney at the Immigration Unit at

Ms. Conde-Hernández’s story was documented in American Sueño:
Onward,
a
five-part
documentary
series,
available
at
http://newestamericans.com/american-sueno-onward/.
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Suffolk County Legal Aid Society, where she provides advice to Suffolk Legal
Aid attorneys and others about the immigration consequences of criminal
charges for noncitizen clients. Id.
These are a few examples of the applicants who would be precluded from
practicing law in Utah absent this Court’s adoption of the Proposed Rule.
These amici demonstrate that qualified DACA recipients and similar
unauthorized immigrants are equally capable of establishing the “honesty,
trustworthiness, diligence, [and] reliability” necessary to be a Utah attorney.
Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708(a). Failing to adopt the Proposed Rule would be
a disservice to the Utah Bar, which would benefit greatly from the diversity
applicants like the above amici would bring to the bar, and the expected
voluntary pro-bono representation they could provide to Utah’s low-income
population. One California court, considering a statutory exclusion that
prevented a “permanent resident alien” from admission to the bar, put it
eloquently:
For a contemporary example we need only look to the case of the
present petitioner. As noted above, he settled in California over a
decade ago with the intent of becoming a permanent resident … ;
he received both his undergraduate and legal education here, and
took and passed the California Bar Examination. To suggest that
such a person lacks “appreciation of the spirit of American
institutions” merely because he is not himself a citizen
demonstrates the irrationality of excluding aliens on this ground.
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Raffaelli v. Comm. of Bar Exam’rs, 496 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Cal. 1972). In light of
the many examples of unauthorized immigrants successfully and ethically
practicing law in other states, it would be irrational for Utah to categorically
bar qualified unauthorized immigrants simply because of their immigration
status. See id.
C.

A Person’s Immigration Status Does Not Relate to That
Person’s Ability to Establish Character and Fitness.

A bar applicant’s immigration status simply is not relevant to that
person’s character and fitness to practice law. First, unlawful presence within
the U.S. has “always been a civil, not criminal, violation” of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”). Congressional Research Service Report,
Immigration Enforcement in the United States, at 8 (April 6, 2006),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33351.pdf (emphasis added); see also Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012) (“[I]t is not a crime for a removable
alien to remain present in the United States.”).
Second, the INA authorizes the Attorney General to cancel the removal
of, and adjust a deportable immigrant’s status if, among other things, the
immigrant has had good moral character during his or her stay in the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Thus, even the INA recognizes that
unauthorized immigrants may still possess good moral character despite their
immigration status, and this Court should not presume otherwise.
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Based on the foregoing, this Court should adopt the Proposed Rule. It
would benefit the bar, the community, and society. And as discussed next, this
Court indeed has the authority to adopt the Proposed Rule.
II.

THIS
COURT
HAS
EXCLUSIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY GOVERNING BAR ADMISSIONS AND SHOULD
ADOPT THE PROPOSED RULE UNDER THAT AUTHORITY.
As a preliminary matter, § 1621 does not make unauthorized

immigrants ineligible for a Utah bar license, for the reasons already explained
by other amici. E.g., Br. of Ad Hoc Coalition of Law Professors 7–15; Br. of Parr
Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. 3–7. But even if § 1621 does apply here, this Court
is the constitutionally mandated governmental branch to opt out of § 1621(a)’s
prohibitions. Section 1621(d) authorizes this Court to grant Petitioners
admission to the Utah State bar and it can do so because: (1) Utah’s
Constitution vests all power to regulate the practice of law with this Court and
a contrary interpretation violates Utah’s Constitution; (2) any contrary
interpretation requiring Utah legislative action to opt out would violate
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment; and (3) an
interpretation requiring Utah legislative action also violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
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A.

Section 1621(d) Authorizes This Court to Allow
Unauthorized Immigrants Admission to the Utah State Bar,
and a Contrary Interpretation Violates the Utah
Constitution.

Section 1621 prohibits states from conferring certain benefits upon
defined “aliens” unless the state enacts a law opting out of the federal
restrictions. In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 589. Even if this Court were to find a
Utah bar license is a “benefit” falling within § 1621’s scope, this Court, and
only this Court, may opt out of the federal restriction under § 1621(d).
The court in Vargas analyzed § 1621(d)’s opt out provision consistent
with Utah’s constitutional system for regulating the practice of law. The proper
interpretation of § 1621(d) authorizes this Court to permit membership of
unauthorized immigrants in the Utah State Bar because this Court is the
constitutionally mandated coequal branch of government with exclusive
responsibility for determining who can practice law in Utah. See Utah Const.
art. VIII, § 4; Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 14, 376
P.3d 14 (“Because there is no limitation found within the constitution on our
ability to govern the practice of law, we maintain the exclusive authority to do
so.”). From Utah’s statehood, this Court has “always had the ability to regulate
the admission and discipline of attorneys.” Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016
UT 21, ¶ 17.
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Before 1981, this Court’s power was inherent and not exclusive—this
Court and the legislature “concurrently governed the Utah State Bar.” Id. at
¶ 19. That ended in 1985, “when the constitution was amended to explicitly
grant the Utah Supreme Court the exclusive power to govern the practice of
law.” Id. ¶ 21; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4 (“[T]he Supreme Court by rule shall
govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the conduct
and discipline of persons admitted to practice law.”). And this Court has since
rejected any notion that it shares “power to regulate the practice of law with
the legislature.” Id. at ¶ 28.
For over thirty years, therefore, this Court has been the sole
governmental branch with authority to determine whether persons are eligible
to practice law in Utah. The framers of the 1985 amendment were wise in
taking this power from the legislature and placing it with this Court because
“[t]his power is considered essential to the [sic] maintaining an independent
judiciary.” Id. at ¶ 23 (internal alteration in original) (quoting Constitutional
Revision Comm’n, Report to the Governor and the 45th Legislature 19 (1984));
see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991) (“[T]he courts
have historically regulated admission to the practice of law before them.”).
Pursuant to the Utah Constitution, this Court creates all rules governing
the practice of law in Utah including rules governing the qualifications of
applicants. For example, this Court establishes the Character and Fitness
28

requirements candidates must meet, and it establishes rules requiring the type
of bar examination. Accordingly, as the result of the 1985 amendment, the
legislature now lacks constitutional authority to opt out under § 1621(d). 24
Because Utah’s legislature was stripped of its power to regulate the practice of
law, this Court is Petitioners’ only recourse. This Court should construe the
phrase “enactment of a State law” to include any state action that has the force
of law, including the orders of this duly empowered court. Under this reading,
an order of this Court admitting Petitioners to the bar would satisfy the opt
out provision.
A narrower interpretation, like that adopted by the Florida Supreme
Court, would not pass constitutional muster in Utah. The Florida Supreme
Court construed § 1621(d)’s opt out provision to require the state legislature to
pass a bill the governor would then sign into law. See Florida Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 134 So.3d at 435. But, as discussed above, the Utah Constitution
has now vested this Court with exclusive rule-making authority regarding bar
admissions. The Utah State Legislature therefore cannot pass a law in the

It appears some Utah legislators agree. Dennis Romboy, Utah legislators
eye ways for law school grads with DACA status to take bar exam, KSL (May
16, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JmTnaS (quoting state legislator as saying, “I don’t
know that there is a legislative remedy” for allowing DACA recipients
admission to the Utah Bar, “given that the Supreme Court exclusively
regulates the practice of law”).
24
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same way Florida did.25 Also, the Florida court did not address whether its
interpretation of § 1621(d) violates the Tenth Amendment. See In re Vargas,
10 N.Y.S.3d at 594 (explaining that no prior courts, including Florida,
addressed whether § 1621(d) violates the Tenth Amendment). As discussed
below, the Florida court’s interpretation indeed violates the Tenth Amendment.
Accordingly, this Court should follow and adopt the Vargas court’s
interpretation to avoid the constitutional conflict. See Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015
UT 34, ¶ 38, 345 P.3d 719 (explaining that under the canon of constitutional
avoidance “courts may reject[] one of two plausible constructions of a statute
on the ground that it would raise grave doubts as to its constitutionality”).
B.

Interpreting “Enactment of a State Law” to Require Utah
Legislative Action Violates the Tenth Amendment.

A legislative enactment requirement, if § 1621(d) were read to impose
one, would be unconstitutional because principles of state sovereignty under

To interpret § 1621(d) as requiring Utah’s legislature to act would also
result in absurdity, because such an interpretation would require the Utah
legislature to do what the Utah legislature is forbidden from doing. Injured
Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 21; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. For this
reason as well, this Court should adopt the Vargas court’s interpretation. State
ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 15 n.5, 165 P.3d 1206 (“[W]hen the statutory
language plausibly presents the court with two alternative readings, we prefer
the reading that avoids absurd results.”); see also Turner v. Staker & Parson
Co., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (“Wherever possible, we give effect to every
word of a statute, avoiding any interpretation which renders parts or words in
a statute inoperative or superfluous”).
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the Tenth Amendment protect the integrity and independence of state
governments against undue interference from the federal government. “The
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to
require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.” New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992). But that is exactly what a legislative
enactment requirement would do here.
Under the Tenth Amendment, “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. The Tenth
Amendment “expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the state’s integrity or their ability
to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
547 n.7 (1975). The Tenth Amendment recognizes the historical fact that
“States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact.” Blatchford
v. Native Vill. Of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). And “inherent in the
respect for state sovereignty is the recognition that ‘the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress’ instructions.’” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 162).
Federalism principles embodied in the Tenth Amendment bar both direct
and indirect interference by the federal government. For example, Congress
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may not direct a state to enact a specific law or implement a specific policy,
and “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the legislative process of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.’” New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Congress also may not
commandeer executive-branch officials. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997). Even when Congress incentivizes the states to act in a certain way, it
cannot unduly coerce the states into making choices in a way that undermines
the independence of the decision-making process. See New York, 505 U.S. at
174–78; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 577–78.
Similarly, Congress violates federalism principles when it specifies
which state official or which branch of state government may exercise the
power of the state sovereign. Since “a State can only perform its functions
through its officers, a restraint upon them is a restraint upon its sovereignty.”
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 747 (1999). Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted a statute contrary to its “plain language” to
avoid interfering with state government decision-makers. Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 465–66 (1991) (refusing to apply the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act to a state’s requirement that its supreme-court judges
retire at the age of seventy, even though the “plain language” dictated
otherwise). In doing so, the Court explained that it is “essential to the
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independence of the States … that their power to prescribe the qualifications
of their own officers [should be] exclusive, and free from external interference,
except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.” Id.
at 460. Gregory dealt with the state’s sovereign interest in determining who
holds office. Under the Tenth Amendment a state has a similar interest in
determining which of its branches makes governing decisions.
State sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment therefore protects a
state’s choice to allocate power among its coequal branches of government.
Congress lacks authority to dictate to the states which governmental branch
possesses power over a particular governmental function. “The ability, indeed
the right, of the states to structure their governmental decision-making
processes as they see fit is essential to the sovereignty protected by the Tenth
Amendment.” In re Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d at 594. If the opt out provision were
construed to impose a legislative enactment requirement, it would violate
Utah’s state sovereignty because it would dictate that Utah may only regulate
legal practice through its legislature, and not through its courts.
But as discussed above, the Utah Constitution was amended to eliminate
the legislature’s power to regulate legal practice and to delegate all authority
to this Court. Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶ 19, 28. Were this
Court to construe § 1621(d) to require a legislative enactment, the State’s
hands would be tied, because the Utah Constitution, as interpreted by this
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Court, flatly prohibits the Utah Legislature from enacting any state law
governing bar admissions.
In sum, Utah’s distribution of responsibility for bar admission decisions
represents a careful balancing that the federal government has no authority to
disrupt. Utah has a fundamental interest in allocating power among its three
coequal governmental branches and is in a unique position to determine how
best to allocate responsibility for regulating the practice of law. Utah has
clearly spoken that regulations governing the practice of law are best handled
by the judiciary, and thus only handled by the judiciary. Construing § 1621(d)
to require a legislative enactment means that Congress can substitute its
preferences for the Utah Constitution. This, Congress cannot do. See U.S.
Const. amend. X.
C.

Interpreting “Enactment of a State Law” to Require Utah
Legislative Action Violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.

As explained above, interpreting § 1621(d) to require legislative
enactment would have the practical result of ensuring bar applicants like
Petitioners can never obtain a Utah bar license, because the Utah Constitution
prohibits the legislature from enacting the law that § 1621(d) requires. Injured
Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶ 21; Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4. Thus, a
decision interpreting the opt out provision as requiring legislative enactment
is a decision that those like Petitioners are categorically banned from the
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practice law in Utah. Such a decision would violate the Constitution’s Equal
Protection clause.
Under the Equal Protection clause, “No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Utah Const. art.
I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”). “The
Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike.’” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). “A State cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or
for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M., 353
U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957). The Equal Protection Clause was adopted to abolish
governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on
the basis of individual merit. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22. “A State can require
high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in
its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must
have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.” Schware, 353 U.S. at 239.
A decision that denies DACA recipients, those granted TPS, or
unauthorized immigrants in general from admission to the Utah Bar would
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unlawfully classify those groups for disparate treatment in at least three
different ways. First, such a decision would treat DACA recipients who need a
license for their profession differently from other DACA recipients who do not.
Second, a decision banning unauthorized immigrants in general from
obtaining a bar license treats them differently from citizens or other applicants.
Third, and relatedly, a decision banning DACA recipients from obtaining a bar
license would treat bar applicants differently on the basis of race. Although
DACA is not solely limited to the Latinx population, the overwhelming
majority of DACA recipients are from Mexico and Central and South America.
UCSIS,

Approximate

Active

DACA

Recipients:

Country

of

Birth,

https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%2
0Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DAC
A_Population_Data_July_31_2018.pdf (showing that, of about 703,000 active
DACA recipients in July 2018, the top four most common countries of birth for
such recipients were Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, which
accounted for 623,000 of active DACA recipients, or about 89%).
Accordingly, for this Court to find that § 1621(d) requires legislative
action, this Court would also have to find that there is at least26 a rational basis

A higher level of scrutiny would likely apply here, see Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to a state law
that created a classification based on alienage); Application of Griffiths, 413

26
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for treating DACA recipients and unauthorized immigrants in general
differently from other equally qualified bar applicants. See Brewer, 757 F.3d at
1065. But there is no such rational basis here, because a bar applicant’s
immigration status has nothing to do with whether the applicant is qualified
to practice law.
Any disparate treatment by Utah of DACA recipients (or unauthorized
immigrants) must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to be
constitutional. City of Clerburne v. Clerburne Living Or., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985). Rational basis review is the most deferential level of review for the
State. State action must be struck down unless there is some rational basis for
it. FCC v. Beach Comm., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
No doubt the State has a “legitimate interest in determining whether [an
applicant] has the qualities of character and the professional competence

U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (same): Nyqusit v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (same), or
possibly intermediate scrutiny, see Plyer, 457 U.S. at 214–20 (applying
heightened scrutiny to children whose presence is unauthorized); Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 60–03 (1987) (explaining that intermediate scrutiny
applies to quasi-suspect groups and those groups are discrete, obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics, and are politically powerless).
But because § 1621, if interpreted to categorically bar all unauthorized
immigrants from receiving bar licenses, fails even rational basis review, this
Court need not resolve which level applies. Brewer, 757 F.3d at 1065 (affirming
a preliminary injunction against an Arizona policy that denied drivers’ licenses
to DACA recipients, finding it unnecessary to decide what standard of scrutiny
applies because Arizona’s “policy is likely to fail even rational basis review”).
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requisite to the practice of law.” Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971)
(plurality opinion). This Court has stated “[t]he practice of law is so affected
with the public interest that the state has both a right and a duty to control
and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare.” Nelson v. Smith, 154
P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1944). The practice of law is regulated to ensure certain
qualifications are met, such as good moral character, proficiency in the law,
and possession of the requisite skill set to practice the profession. Schware, 353
U.S. at 238–39; New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 276 (1985); Injured
Workers Ass’n of Utah, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶ 17–20. Ultimately, an applicant’s
conduct should demonstrate “honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, [and]
reliability,” and this Court has established seventeen factors to determine an
applicant’s character and fitness. See Utah R. Bar Admission 14-708.
The state’s interest in regulating the practice of law is not advanced by
treating unauthorized immigrants differently than other equally qualified bar
applicants. A per se ban on unauthorized immigrants is not related to any of
the factors used to determine a bar applicant’s character and fitness. See id.
14-708(d). Nor is there any evidence that unauthorized immigrants are
unqualified to be attorneys by virtue of their immigration status.
In sum, an applicant’s immigration status simply has nothing to do with
the purposes of licensing attorneys—immigration status has no bearing on
whether an attorney graduated law school, passed the bar, or otherwise has
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the qualifications necessary to be an attorney. This is especially true here,
where Petitioners both graduated from ABA accredited Utah law schools, are
members in good standing of the State Bar of California and otherwise appear
to meet all of Utah’s standards for bar admissions except for immigration
status. Petitioners have already been admitted to practice law in California
without incident, and Petitioners’ non-citizen immigration status does not
denigrate the standards of the bar, nor does it allow for others who may be
unqualified to be admitted to the bar. The only distinction between Petitioners
and every other member of the Utah Bar is that Petitioners, through no fault
of their own, were brought to this country as children. This distinction has no
bearing on Petitioners’ ability to practice law, and a distinction on this basis is
not rationally related to the state’s interest.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners, as well as other DACA recipients, and unauthorized
immigrants in general, should not be prejudged as morally unfit to be lawyers
merely because of their immigration status. To the contrary, the experience of
other states is that such individuals are a boon to the profession and a benefit
to society. And because this Court is the only branch of government with the
explicit authority to adopt such a rule under the Utah Constitution, this Court
can and should adopt a rule allowing otherwise qualified unauthorized
immigrants to be admitted to the Utah Bar.
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